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ABSThAC
Thispaper examines the allocation of credit in a market in which
borrowers have greater information concerning their own riskiness than do
lenders. it illustrates (1) the allocation of credit is inefficientand at
times can be improved by government intervention, and (2) smallchanges in
the exogenous risk-free interest rate can cause large(discontinuous) changes
in the allocation of credit and the efficiency of the marketequilibrium.







In this paper I examine the allocation of credit in a market in which
borrowers have greater information on the probability of default than do
lenders. My purpose is to illustrate two propositions. First, the
equilibrium resulting in an unfettered market is inefficient; government
intervention of a sort often observed may at times be able to enhance market
efficiency, even if the government has no informational advantage over
lenders. Second, the unfettered market equilibrium is precarious: small
changes in the exogenous risk-free interest rate can cause large and
inefficient changes in the allocation of credit.
Many recent studies note the importance of asymmetric information for
credit markets.1 The two results emphasized here, while natural consequences
of asymmetric information, often escape unnoticed. Understanding these
conclusions, however, is critical to evaluating the impact of various
government policies.
Government intervention into the allocation of credit is substantial.
Federal loan guarantees to the Chrysler Corporation and to New York City are
among the most publicized examples. On a continuing basis, the government
plays a central role in the markets for loans to students, farmers, and
homeowners. Economists often criticize this role on the grounds that the
market can best allocate credit.2 The model presented here shows that this
conclusion is not generally correct. While credit programs are frequently
justified on distributional grounds, I show that a social planner concerned
solely with economic efficiency may often endorse the type of policy—2—
currently effective in many credit markets.
The model presented here is close in spirit to those of Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) and Ordover and Weiss [1981).The common theme is that changes
in the interest rate alter the riskiness of the pool of borrowers. While
these previous two papers note the possibility that the equilibrium is
socially inefficient, the policy interventions they propose do not correct
the market failure discussed here. Stiglitz and Weiss suggest a usury law
(an interest rate ceiling) as one solution. In the model of this paper, a
usury law does not improve on the market allocation; instead, it causes the
market for these loans to disappear.3Ordover and Weiss propose the policy
of forcing banks to lend to all borrowers at some interest rate. The
equilibrium in this model, however, can be inefficient even if no borrower is
credit rationed in the sense of being excluded at any interest rate; even
when such credit rationing does occur, the Ordover-Weiss policy merely
induces banks to charge a prohibitively high interest rate. In neither case
is this policy effective. Nonetheless, a credit subsidy, such as a loan
guarantee, can at times improve on the market allocation.
The model also has macroeconomic implications. As noted above, in the
absence of government intervention, an increase in the exogenous risk-free
interest rate can cause the collapse of the credit market. A market that was
efficient at the initial interest rate can disappear, driving out socially
profitable investments. In other words, the total surplus derived for a
particular credit market can be a discontinuous function of the interest
rate. In models without asymmetric information, restrictive monetary policy
moves the economy smoothly along the marginal efficiency of capital schedule;—3-.
in this model, restictive policy is potentially more costly, as it can
precipitate a financial crisis.
While the model in this paper is general, I present it in the context of
a specific credit market. In particular, I discuss loans from banks to
students. There are two reasons that student loans are a useful prototype
for studying credit market imperfections. First, only a limited number of
financial instruments are available to students. A corporation can fund
investments with either debt or equity. It has, in addition, more complex
options: preferred stock, convertable bonds, callable bonds. Imperfections
in the market for one instrument may be less important if there exist other
financing methods. In contrast, a student faces a much simpler problem. He
must borrow if he is to invest; he cannot issue equity on his human capital.
In principle, we could attempt to explain the paucity of financial
instruments available to the student. For this paper, though, it is both
reasonable and realistic to assume that his only option is debt finance.
The second reason for discussing the market for student loans is that it
has evoked substantial government intervention. The OECD reported in 1978
that Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the
United States all provide assistance to students in the form of loans or loan
guarantees. Of course, there are many reasons for public support of
education. Nonetheless, it is instructive that this support so often takes
the form of credit market intervention. The pervasiveness of public student
loan programs suggests at least the perception of imperfections in the market
for credit.—4-
II. THE MODEL
This section presents a simple model of a market for loans to a
particular group of students. To the banks, who provide the loans, the
students are indistinguishable. The students, though, differ by the expected
return on their education and by their probability of repaying the loan.
Each student knows his own expected return and repayment probability, even
though they are not observable by the banks or by the government.
Both students and banks are risk neutral. I make this assumption to
simplify the analysis. There is no reason to suppose that the market failure
discussed here would disappear if some agents were risk averse. A major
advantage of the risk neutrality assumption is that it makes clear that the
market failure is not attributable to the underprovision of insurance to risk
averse agents.
Each potential student is considering investing in some human capital,
say, a college degree. The project is discrete, has unit cost, and has
expected future payment R. (All return variables I use are expressed as the
return factor. That is, if the expected return is 5 percent, then R =1.05)
The other characteristic of each student is the probability P that he will
repay the loan. The values of R and P vary across students. Each student
knows his own R and P, but these characteristics are not observable by banks.
These two characteristics are distributed throughout the population with the
density function f(P,R), which is public knowledge.
The model takes each student's parameters P and R as primitive. One
could construct a more complete model in which the student's default
behaviour is endogenous. For example, one could model the students as having—5—
varying degrees of honesty; certain students get greater disutility from
dishonest acts. Default probabilities vary because a less honest student is
more likely to avoid repayment illegitimately. Alternatively, one could
model all the students as well-meaning. A student then defaults when his
return leaves him unable to repay his loan ex post; the probability of this
state occuring is then private information.4 Either such model might suggest
that each student's repayment probabilty depends on the market interest rate.
I maintain the assumption that P is exogenous for each student to simplify
the exposition.
A bank can invest in a safe asset, such as a Treasury bill, and obtain
the certain future payment p. Alternatively, a bank can lend to one of the
above group of students. Let r be the interest rate the bank charges these
students. It is the same for all students, since they are indistinguishable
to the bank.
If a student defaults, the bank receives no payment on the loan.
Including a default payment of A (A <p),such as collateral, is certainly
possible. In particular, in such a world, one could consider the student as
taking out a loan of A/p that is repaid with certainty and a loan of 1 -A/p
that is repaid with probability P and and fully defaulted with probability
1 -P.It is straightforward to carry the extra terms throughout the
analysis and show that the existence of the risk-free loan does not
substantially affect the market for the risky loan. Thus, I set the default
payment to zero without loss of generality.5
Let II be the average probability of repayment; that is, II is the average
of P for those potential students who in fact borrow. The expected payment-6-
to the bank on a student loan is fir. This expected payment must equal the
safe payment p if the bank is to make any student loans. Hence, the first
equilibrium condition is
(1) fir =p.
This equation describes the locus of market loan rates and repayment
probabilities that provide the lenders the required rate of return.
Each potential student must decide whether to borrow at the market rate
r and invest in additional human capital. The expected return on his
investment is R, while the expected cost of borrowing is Pr. Hence,
he borrows and invests if and only if R >Pr.It is useful to
examine this investment condition graphically. Figure I shows the area in
(R,P) space for which the investment is made. Those students in areas A and
B borrow and invest. Those in areas C and D do not. Ar, increase in the
loan rate from r0 to r1 unambiguously reduces the areas A and B, and thus
reduces the number of loans and investments. Given any expected return R,
the students driven out by the increase in the interest rate are those with
relatively high repayment probabilities.
Even at this early stage, we can show the market allocation is not fully
efficient. An investment should be made, from the viewpoint of the social
planner, if and only if the expected return R exceeds the opportunity cost p.
Those investments in area B are socially efficient and are undertaken, while
those in C are socially inefficient and are not undertaken. Vet those
investments in area D are socially efficient but not undertaken, and those
in area A are socially inefficient and are undertaken. No loan rate r can—7—
make both areas A and D disappear. Thus, no loan rate, including the market
equilibrium rate, can in general reach the first best allocation.
The assumption of asymmetic information plays a key role here. As
already mentioned, a student invests if R >Pr.Using the equilibrium
condition (1), the investment condition is R >(P/fl)p.If there is no
information asymmetry regarding the default probability, then P =ifand the
student invests if and only if his return is socially profitable (R >p).In
this case, the market reaches the fully efficient allocation even though R is
not publicly observable. If there is information asymmetry regarding P, then
low P investments are overly encouraged and high P investments are overly
discouraged.
The repayment probability 11 as seen by banks is the average of P for
those students who invest, that is, for those in areas A and B. Thus, the
function relating r to 11 is
(2) fl(r) =E[P R >Pr].
For any density f(P,R), the function 11(r) is a well-defined conditional
expectation.
III. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
Equations (1) and (2) are the equilibrium two conditions. They
simultaneously determine the market loan rate r, from which we can infer the
decision of each potential student and, thereby, the average repayment
probability 11.It is useful to illustrate the equilibrium conditions
graphically. Equation (1) defines a rectangular hyperbola, which is labelled—8-
LL in Figure II since it is determined by the required return of lenders.
Equation (2) is labelled BB, since it is determined by the
optimizing reaction of borrowers. The shape of the BB curve is more
ambiguous. As r goes to zero, 11 approaches the unconditional expectation
E(P) <1,since everyone borrows. As r goes to infinity, fl goes to zero as
long as R is bounded from above and f(P,R) is non-zero everywhere else. If R
were constant across borrowers, the BB curve would be monotonic; as r rises,
high P borrowers drop out of the market. In general both R and P vary and
the BB curve need not be monotonic.6
The IL curve and the BB curve might not intersect, as in Figure III.
In this case, there is no equilibrium in which loans are made. At any
interest rate, the pool of students who seek loans is too risky to give the
banks their required return. I call this a "collapsed" credit market.
The two curves may intersect more than once, as they do in Figure II.
If they do cross more than once, it seems reasonable to restrict attention
to the first intersection and to rule out any additional equilibrium as
not stable. To see why, consider point y in Figure II. If the economy
were at this point, both equilibrium conditions would be satisfied. But a
bank would have an incentive to lower its interest rate, say to r1. At r1,
the BB curve lies above the LL curve. The repayment probability II is thus
greater than necessary to give the bank its required return p. A bank can
therefore make a higher expected return by charging r1, which is below the
"market" rate ry. Similar reasoning shows that point x is a stable
equilibrium. At interest rates just above r, lenders earn a rate of return
above p, which causes a capital inflow and lowers the interest rate.-9-
Conversely, at interest rates below r, the repayment probability is too low
to give banks a return of p, which causes a capital outflow and raises the
interest rate. For these reasons, only the first crossing appears to be an
interesting equilibrium.
It is possible that there are more than two crossing of the two curves.
If so, at the third (and every odd) crossing the BB curve cuts the LL curve
from below. Thus, the intersection is locally stable; that is, a bank could
not make a profit by a small reduction in its interest rate. The further
intersections, however, are not globally stable, since a bank could make a
large reduction in its interest rate and make positive profits. Hence, even
if there are multiple crossings, we should expect the economy to locate at
the first one.
Strong unequivocal statements regarding the welfare properties of the
market equilibrium are impossible. As discussed above, if there is no
information asymmetry regarding P, the market reaches the first best
allocation. At other times, however, the market is grossly inefficient and
government intervention can enhance efficiency. To illustrate this
possibility, I examine a special case.
Example: Uniform Expected Return
Suppose that the expected return R is constant across students. The
only unobserved heterogeneity is the repayment probability P.In this case,
the market fails to reach the first best allocation.
Since R is constant, either all the investments are socially efficient
or all are socially inefficient. If an equilibrium exists, then the invest--10-
ments are socially efficient. That is, if the SB curve and the LL curve
interesect, then the expected return R exceeds the opportunity cost of capi-
tal p. This proposition is easy to prove. As discussed earlier, a student
borrows if and only if R >Pr.Averaging this inequality over the
investments undertaken shows R >fir.Since fir =p,we know R >p.Thus, if
R is an observable characteristic, then the unfettered market equilibrium
allows only socially productive investments.
On the other hand, investments may be socially productive but not
undertaken in equilibrium. That is, it is possible the projects are
productive in the sense that R >p,but not all investments are undertaken.
An example most easily shows this proposition. Suppose P is uniformly
distributed from zero to one. Then equilibrium condition (2) becomes: Ii
for r<R, fl =R/2rfor r>R. The LL curve lies above the BB curve at all r,
unless R >2p.In this example, no equilibrium exists unless the expected
payment is twice the required payment. The unfettered market equilibrium may
leave profitable investment opportunities unrealized.
IV. GOVERNMENT CREDIT POLICY
I now discuss the potential for efficient government intervention.
Imagine the market begin in the unregulated equilibrium. Let us consider the
effects of a small credit subsidy, which would reduce the market interest
rate r and shift leftward the upward sloping line in Figure I.
This reduction in the interest rate has two effects. First, it reduces
the area D; some of those students with high returns and high repayment
probabilities who were previously not investing are now induced to invest.—11—
Second, it increases area A; some more students with low returns and low
repayment probabilities are induced to invest. The first effect is socially
beneficial while the second is socially harmful.
A government loan guarantee is a special case of a subsidy. In
particular, under a guarantee program, the market rate becomes the risk-free
rate (r =p);that is, a loan guarantee is equivalent to a government loan at
the risk-free interest rate. At r =p,area 0 disappears, implying that all
socially productive investments are undertaken.
To evaluate the net social impact of such a subsidy, one only needs to
know the distribution of attributes, f(P,R). It is not necessary for the
government to be able to distinguish the high return students from the low
return students. As the example below illustrates, it is possible that the
extra investment generated is on net socially optimal but is not undertaken
in the market equilibrium because it requires that fir <p.
Of course a government credit subsidy has a budgetary cost. While the
return from students to banks is fir, banks still require return p. The
difference is made up by the government. If the government must raise money
using distortionary taxes, then the deadweight losses are an additional cost
of the credit program. As with all expenditure programs, the marginal
benefit must exceed the marginal deadweight losses if the program is to be
socially efficient.
Before turning to the example, a few general propositions regarding the
optimal interest rate r* can be established.First, r* is never below the
risk-free return p; charging a lower rate would only induce inefficient
investment. Second, r* is generally strictly above the risk-free rate. To
see this, note that social welfare (ignoring the cost of raising revenue) is:—12—
(3) Social Welfare =II (R-p)f(P,R) dR dP
0 Pr
The derivative of social welfare with respect to the interest rate r is:
1
(4) d SW =I —P(Pr—p)f(P,Pr) dP
dr
Evaluated at r =p,this derivative is non-negative and is strictly positive
as long as f(P,R) is everywhere non-zero. Thus, an efficient loan program
generally charges a loan rate greater than the risk-free rate.
Third, depending on the density f(P,R), it is possible that the optimal
interest rate r* exceeds the unregulated equilibrium interest rate re. In
this case, the government would tax student loans to drive out borrowers with
low R and low P.7 While it is difficult to derive general conditions under
which r* >re,it is possible to examine the effect on social welfare of
small changes in the interest rate around re. In particular, at re the sign
of the dSW/dr is the same as the sign of dfl/dr.8 Hence, if the BB curve is
upward sloping at the equilibrium, then a small increase in the interest rate
is welfare-enhancing; conversely, if the BB curve is downward sloping at the
equilibrium, then a small decrease in the interest rate is welfare-enhancing.
In other words, if a small subsidy or tax is to increase social welfare, it
must increase the average repayment probability.
Example, continued
Consider again the example of uniform expected returns. Suppose the
government provides a loan guarantee. The vertical line r =preplaces the
LL curve, as in Figure IV. This program clearly changes the nature of the
equilibrium. In particular, it ispossiblethat the guarantee program—13-
creates a market, whereas without the program, no market existed, as in
Figure III.
As already noted, under a guarantee program, all socially profitable
investments are undertaken. It is possible, though, that socially
unproductive investments are undertaken once the guarantee is provided. That
is, even if R <p,those students for whom P <Ripchoose to borrow and
invest. Of course, since R is known in this example, the government can
avoid this inefficiency by providing guarantees only if R >p.
The reason the government can so effectively correct the market failure
is that the government requires a different information set than private
lenders. To make a socially profitable loan, we only need to know that the
expected return R exceeds the required return p. The probability of
repayment P pj se is irrelevant to a social planner. (Remember that the
government program is not required to be revenue neutral.) Yet to private
lenders, the expected return on a project R jseis irrelevant, and the
repayment probability P is critically important. Hence, this example of
constant R may be the case in which the government can most easily improve on
the private allocation of credit.
Under what conditions is the unfettered market least efficient? To
answer this question, I specialize the example further by supposing P is
uniformly distributed from P0 to P1. From (2) and straightforward
calculation, we can compute the equation f or the BB curve. It is
(5) 11 =(P0+P1)/2for 0 <r<R/P1
=(P0+R/r)/2for R/P1 <r<R/P0.-14-
The intersection of (1) and (5) determines the interest rate in an unfettered




Note that the level of risk--P0 and P1-—is not relevant to the number of
loans made in equilibrium. Instead, the ratio Pj/P0 is the crucial
determinant. As P1/P0 increases, the number of loans made decreases. The
more heterogeneous are the borrowers in terms of their repayment
probabilities, the more severe is the market failure and the greater is the
benefit of government intervention.
V. FINANCIAL COLLAPSE
Let us now return to the unfettered market equilibrium and consider the
effects of an increase in the required rate of return p. This change shifts
the LL curve upward and to the right, as in Figure V. Not surprisingly, the
interest rate charged to these borrowers increases. As shown in Section II,
the number of students taking out loans declines. The effect on fl is in
general ambiguous, as the BB curve need not be downward sloping.
An increase in the interest rate can have far more serious effects. It
is possible that a shift in the LL curve can make the equilibrium disappear.
Whereas at the lower interest rate, the economy is modeled as in Figure II,
at the higher interest rate, Figure III is the more appropriate
representation. Remember that the investment projects may still be socially
profitable at the new higher interest rate. Nonetheless, none of the
investors is able to raise the necessary capital.—15—
An inward shift in the BB curve has the same effects as an increase in
the interest rate. A small increase in the riskiness of some of the
potential borrowers can cause the credit market for all of them to collapse,
even though there may be no change in the expected return of investment
projects R. Hence, small changes in risk perception can have large effects
upon the allocation of credit.
One of the previous examples can usefully illustrate the model's
potential for financial collapse. Let R be constant and let P be uniformly
distributed from zero to one. Section III showed that no equilibrium exists
when p >R12.At p <R/2,all students borrow in the equilibrium. Figure VI
displays the surplus received from this market as a function of the safe
interest rate. At p <R/2,the surplus received is R -p,while at p >R/2,
no surplus is received, as no loans are made. Thus, at p =R/2,there is a
severe discontinuity. A small increase in the interest rate can cause the
disappearance of market for loans to these borrowers. The social cost of
this sudden financial collapse is potentially great and could reasonably
motivate the government to act as the lender of last resort.
This potential for financial collapse has important macroeconomic
implications. In the textbook IS-UI model, restrictive monetary policy (or
any contractionary shift in the LII curve) reduces aggregate demand by
increasing the real interest rate. At this greater required rate of return,
some investments are no longer profitable. Thus, in the textbook model, a
monetary contraction precludes marginally productive investments. In this
alternative model of the allocation of credit, however, restictive monetary
policy can have more dramatic effects. The higher interest rate can cause—16—
the collapse of the market to some borrowers, even though their projects may
remain socially productive at the higher interest rate. A monetary
contraction can therefore have a large impact on the efficiency of the market
allocation of credit. It is possible that when the monetary authority induces
or allows a "credit crisis," government intervention on behalf of certain
borrowers is efficiency enhancing, even though these borrowers may require no
assistance under normal credit market conditions.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The Federal government has played a central role in the allocation of
credit among competing uses. This paper illustrates that this sort of
government program can under plausible conditions improve on the unfettered
market allocation. A necessary condition for efficient government
intervention is unobservable heterogeneity among would-be borrowers regarding
the probability of default. The greater is such heterogeneity, the greater
is the potential for efficient intervention.
Historical examinations of financial markets (e.g., Kindleberger
[1978]) emphasize their propensity for instability and collapse. Our models
should therefore reflect this instability. If we are to understand the
effects of alternative monetary policies, for example, we must appreciate the
potential for financial crisis. At times, it may be efficient for the
government to remove some risk from the private sector by guaranteeing
certain financial arrangements or, equivalently, by acting as a lender of
last resort.
Harvard University
and National Bureau of Economic Research—17—
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NOTES
1. See, for example, Akerloff (1970], Jaffee and Russell [1976],
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981], Ordover and Weiss (1981], Bernanke (1983], and
Blinder and Stiglitz [1983].
2. For example, the 1982 Economic Report of the President (p. 94], after
noting that the Federal Government was involved in 21.4 percent of all funds
advanced in U.S. credit markets in fiscal year 1982, presents the standard
evaluation of this credit activity:
Increasingly, therefore, political judgements, rather than
marketplace judgements, have been responsible for allocating
the supply of credit. As the discipline of the marketplace
is replaced by the political process, less efficient economic
activities are financed, and productivity in the economy
declines.
3. I assume that lenders can freely enter from and exit into a risk-free
asset, such as Treasury bills.
4. In such a model, R is the expected payout while 1-P is the probability
that the payout is in the tail of the distribution in which default occurs.
Without further structure, there is no necessary connection between the two
variables.—19-
5.The discussion in the text assumes A is the same for all students. If A
varies and is not observable by the bank, then this uncertainty would enter
the analysis as does uncertainty regarding P.If A varies, is observable,
and is potentially informative regarding P and R, then we could consider a
continuum of credit markets indexed by A; the analysis of each would proceed
as in the text.
6.Even if P and R are independently distributed, the BB curve can be
upward sloping in parts. For example, suppose R takes on the values 1.0 and
3.0 each with probability i, and P takes on the values 0.5 and 1.0 each with





When r increases from just below 2 to just above 2, 1! increases as well.
7.Suppose f(P,R) is (1, 2p) with probabilityand (1/3, 2p/3) with
probability Theequilibrium interest rate is r =3p/2,in which case both
types borrow. An increase in the interest rate would drive out the low
return students before the high return students.
8. This result is established by evaluating (4) at r =p/fland comparing to
the derivative of fl(r). The intuition is that TI'(r) conveys the P for the
marginal borrowers relative to IT and therefore whether they have too little
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